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After  several  decades  of  slow  economic  growth  and  modest  improvements  in
productivity, growth accelerated in the United States in the mid- to late 1990s. Whereas output
increased by only 2.8 percent per year and output per labor hour increased by only 1.0 percent
per  year between  1972 and  1995, they increased by 4.9  percent  and  2.7 percent per  year
respectively between 1995 and  1999 (Gordon, 2000, p.  53).  Although there is considerable
uncertainty regarding the reason for the increase in  growth, many observers attributed it to
growing investment in information technology in general and to the Internet in particular.'  For
example, in Oct 1999, a Business Week  article argued: 2
"We have entered the Age of the Internet, a globe-spanning technology that has
taken hold  amazingly quickly.  Just  as  data flows  across the  Net  in  easily
digestible packets, knowledge, in the broadest sense, can now be easily tapped
and exchanged by people in every corner of the earth.  The result: an explosion of
economic and productivity growth - first in the US, with the rest of the world
soon to follow."
The rapid increase in productivity in the United States led to  considerable discussion
about whether countries that failed to make similar investments would be left behind as growth
in technologically more advanced economies accelerated. Most notably, although developing and
transition economies accounted for 85 percent of the world's population in 2000, they accounted
for  only  20  percent  of  Internet  users and  10 percent  of  global  spending  on  information
I Some formal analyses have supported the assertion that investment in information technology  increased labor
productivity in the 1990s.  For example, Oliner and Sichel (2000) find that 0.45 percentage points of a roughly 1
percentage point increase in labor productivity in the non-farm business sector could be attributed to investment in
information technology.  In contrast to results in Oliner and Sichel (2000), which suggested widespread benefits
from investment in information technology, Gordon (2000) found that the gains were concentrated in computer
hardware manufacturing and that there was no increase in productivity outside of durable manufacturing. Oliner and
Sichel (2000, p. 19) attribute the difference in results to Gordon's (2000) treatment of cyclical effects. In a survey of
firm-level evidence, Brynjolfsson and  Hitt (2000) argue that the  firm-level evidence suggests that  information
technology started affecting  productivity in the early 1990s.
2 "The Intemet Economy: the World's Next Growth Engine" by Michael J. Mandel with Irene M. Kunii, Business
Week (October 4,  1999).  Gordon (2000) includes several similar quotes about  information technology and the
Internet from the Wall Street Journal, Fortune and even Alan Greenspan.
1technology. 3 This, in turn, led to considerable concern that the 'digital divide'  between rich and
poor countries would result in growing global inequality.
The digital divide between the
30  rich  developed  world  and  the  poor
25  - developing world is visible even when
20 - comparing the transition economies of
15 -
10  Eastern Europe and Central Asia with
5  high-income OECD countries.  Over
o-  _  _  _  _25  percent of the inhabitants of high-
-s c  E  - 7X
3jO  °E°u,9  =g  '  o_  income OECD countries have Internet
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Figure  1:  Estimated  Internet  users  per 100  inhabitants  in 1999.  and  the  Baltics,  and  1-2 percent  of
Data Source:  International  Telecommunications  Union.  people in  South Eastern Europe and
Note: See  footnote  12  for definition  of regions.
the  Commonwealth  of  Independent
States (see Figure 1).
The importance of foreign investment as a source of technological transfers suggests that
the disparity between rich and poor countries might be reduced by encouraging foreign investors
from developed countries to invest in developing countries. 4 In addition to increasing Internet
access among the enterprises that directly receive inflows of foreign investment, this might also
result in increased Internet access among domestically owned enterprises.  This diffusion could
occur in several ways. For example, workers and managers who leave foreign-owned enterprises
to join existing domestic firms or to set up their own businesses, might transfer the technologies
used  by  the  foreign-owned  enterprise  to  their  new  employers.  Alternatively,  domestic
enterprises, including competitors and upstream and downstream firms, might simply observe
3 "Falling  through  the  Net?"  The  Economist  (September  21, 2000).
2and copy the  foreign-owned enterprises'  business techniques.  Although the  foreign-owned
enterprise has a strong incentive to prevent domestic competitors from  copying its business
model, some leakage, especially of generic knowledge such as use of information technology,
seems inevitable.  Finally,  foreign-owned enterprises'  demand  for  Internet  services might
encourage the formation of support companies (e.g., web-hosting or web-design companies) that
can then sell their services to other companies in the host country.
Using enterprise level data from 21 transition economies, this paper looks at whether
foreign investment increases Internet access in host countries. First, it looks at whether foreign-
owned firms appear to be more likely to have Internet access than their domestic counterparts.
Second, it looks at whether domestically owned enterprises competing either with foreign-owned
enterprises operating in the host country or with imports also appear more likely to have access
to the Internet - something that might indicate the presence of positive externalities from foreign
trade or investment. Finally, the paper looks at whether FDI appears to increase Internet access
for enterprises other than the foreign-owned firms and their competitors in the host country.  In
general, there appears to be strong evidence that foreign trade and investment encourage higher
levels of Internet access throughout the host economy.
Although the recent discussion on the 'digital divide' between developing and developed
countries makes the question of Internet access interesting in its own right, the topic is also of
interest because of its relationship with more general questions about international transfers of
technology between developing and developed countries. Over the past decade, a large literature
has emerged looking at how enterprises in developing countries gain access to new technologies,
often focusing on  the role  of  foreign investment and  trade.  In  general, although foreign
investment appears to  result  in  improved productivity in  the  enterprises  that  receive the
investment,  there is less evidence of broad spillovers  to the economy as,  a whole.  However, since
most studies have focused on the effect of foreign investment on productivity, it is possible that
the negative results regarding spillovers are due to the short-term pressure that foreign entry puts
4 For  example, Sachs (2000)  proposes FDI  as  a  way of  increasing access to  technology  (although  not just
information technology) in developing countries. BlomstrOm  and Kokko (1996), Barba Navaretti and Tarr (2000),
3on domestic enterprises through product market competition, rather than a lack of technological
transfers. 5 Since this study looks at the adoption of a new technology directly, it avoids the
possibility that pecuniary externalities will obscure technological spillovers.
II.  EFFECT OF FOREIGN  INVESTMENT  ON ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY
Although R&D expenditures are low in developing and transition economies, enterprises
in these countries might gain access to new technologies in other ways, including foreign direct
investment,  joint ventures with foreign firms, licensing, and imports of capital goods. 6 Of these
methods, foreign ownership is often seen as one of the most effective ways for enterprises in
developing and transition economies to gain access to new technologies.  In addition to giving
access to  hard  technological knowledge (e.g.,  blueprints, product  designs  and  machinery),
foreign  investment  might  also  lead  to  transfers  of  generic  knowledge  (e.g.,  improved
management techniques or experience using information technology), which might be harder to
transmit through methods such as licensing or imports of capital goods.  Foreign investment
might be especially effective in the transition economies due to their relatively large stock of
skilled engineers and scientists and  domestic enterprises'  relative inexperience with modern
marketing and management before the start of the transition.
Since it is hard to directly assess the effect of foreign investment on technology transfers,
most studies have focused on the effect of foreign ownership on productivity.  In general, there is
strong evidence that foreign investment improves productivity in enterprises in developing and
transition  economies,  with  many  recent  studies  finding  the  productivity  is  higher  and
productivity growth faster in foreign-owned enterprises in these countries.  For example, in a
and Saggi (2000) provide  recent reviews  of the literature  on the effect of foreign investment  and trade on the
diffusion of technology in developing countries.
5 Aitken and Harrison (1999, p. 607) suggest that entry by foreign owned enterprises that are more efficient that
domestic enterprises might cause a short-term drop in the efficiency of domestic enterprises if it reduces demand for
their products, stopping them from achieving economies of scale.
6 Research and development (R&D) expenditures are far lower in developing and  transition economies than in
developed countries, both in absolute per capita terms and as a share of GDP.  For example, R&D expenditures
accounted  for about 2.4 percent of GNP in high-income OECD countries in 1996, but only 0.8 percent of GNP in the
transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, similar to the level for other low and middle-income economies.
Data is from World Bank (2001),  World Development Indicators.  In  1994, the  last year  for which data was
available,  R&D expenditures accounted for about 0.84 percent of GNP in low and middle-income countries.
4recent study using panel data from Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that foreign
ownership increases productivity in  small, but  not  large, manufacturing plants,  even after
controlling for plant-specific effects.  In  contrast, Haddad  and  Harrison  (1993) found that
foreign-owned enterprises in Morocco were more productive than wholly domestically owned
enterprises, but that productivity grew more slowly.  Since the start of the transition, many
studies have looked at the effect of foreign ownership on productivity and productivity growth in
the transition economies, generally finding that foreign owned enterprises are more productive
than other enterprises. 7
Although it might not be surprising that foreign-owned enterprises are more efficient than
other enterprises in developing and transition, foreign ownership might have broad benefits for
the economy as a  whole.  In addition to  affecting the technology, and productivity, of the
recipient firm, foreign investment might have spillover benefits for other enterprises in the host
country. Saggi (2000) lists several potential spillovers  including:
1.  'Demonstration  effects',  where  domestically owned enterprises  are able  to  observe the
technologies that the foreign-owned enterprise uses and the goods that it produces and can
imitate the production processes or reverse engineer products, allowing the foreign-owned
enterprises' technologies to spread throughout the economy.
2.  Labor turnover, where  domestic enterprises hire former employees of the foreign-owned
enterprise gaining access to the foreign-owned  enterprise's products or processes.
3.  Vertical linkages, where foreign-owned enterprises transfer technologies or provide technical
support to  enterprises that are their suppliers or customers or to  whom they sub-contract
work.
7For example, Smith et  al (1997) found that productivity is higher for firms in Slovenia with higher levels of
foreign ownership, relative to employee or state ownership, after controlling for the possibility that ownership is
endogenous.  In  addition, Frydman et  al (1999) found that  productivity grew more quickly in outsider-owned
(including foreign-owned) enterprises than  it did in state- or insider-owned enterprises  in the  Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary, even after controlling for finn-level effects.  However, they found that foreign-owned firms
did not perform significantly better than other outsider-owned firms did.  Finally, Djankov and Hoekman (2000)
found that foreign direct investment had a positive impact on productivity growth in the Czech Republic, even after
correcting for sample selection bias. Djankov and Murrell (2000) presents a meta-analysis synthesizing  results from
23 studies that look at the effect of ownership on various measures of performance (i.e., not just productivity) in the
5Saggi (2000) distinguishes between these 'pure'  externalities and  pecuniary externalities that
result from the effect of foreign investment on market structure.  Since this  study looks at a
generic technology - access to the Internet - it is plausible that 'demonstration effects' might be
important for the entire economy, not just for enterprises that are direct competitors.
Although the theoretical possibility of spillovers to other enterprises is attractive, there is
little empirical evidence to support the assertion that there are large spillovers associated with
foreign investment.  First, although some studies have found that the mechanisms that might
transmit spillovers are common, others have found little evidence of them. 8 Second, several
recent studies that have looked for evidence of spillovers by looking at the effect of foreign entry
in a given sector on the productivity of domestically owned enterprises have failed to find strong
results.
In the 1970s and 1980s, a large number of studies looked at industry-level data, generally
finding that productivity and productivity growth was higher in sectors with significant foreign
investment. 9 However, as  pointed  out  in  Aitken  and  Harrison  (1999, p.  611), if  foreign
investment is attracted to sectors that are more productive, domestic firms in these sectors would
appear more productive than in other sectors even if spillovers were not important.  To try to
control for self-selection into industries where domestic enterprises are more efficient, several
recent studies have used firm-level data, generally finding little evidence to support the assertion
that spillovers are important. In fact, several studies have found that foreign entry might actually
harm the productivity of domestically owned enterprises. 10 For example, using  data from
Morocco in the 1980s, Haddad and Harrison (1993) found that productivity growth was slower
transition  economies.  They  find  that, overall,  foreign-owned  enterprises  appear  to perform  better  than,  or as well as,
all other  ownership  types  in the transition  economies.
8 For example,  although  Pack (1997) finds a large amount  of labor  turnover between  foreign  multinationals  and
domestic  enterprises  in Taiwan,  Gershenberg  (1987)  finds  only  limited  turnover  in Kenya. In a study  of 65 foreign-
owned enterprises  in  12 developing  countries, Germidis (1977) found that there was little labor turnover,
subcontracting  to local enterprises  or direct  R&D.
9 Saggi  (2000), Haddad  and Harrison  (1993),  and Barba Navaretti  and Tarr (2000) provide brief surveys  of this
literature. Studies  include  Caves  (1974),  Globerman  (1979),  Blomstrom  and Persson  (1983),  Blomstrom (1986),
and Blomstrom and Wolff (1989).
6for  domestic firms  in sectors  with high foreign investment than for  firms in  other sectors,
although the difference was not statistically significant. In addition, Aitken and Harrison (1999)
found that foreign investment in a sector actually reduced productivity for domestically owned
plants in Venezuela. In a similar analysis for the Czech Republic, Djankov and Hoekman (2000)
also  found that  foreign investment reduced the  productivity of wholly  domestically owned
enterprises. One plausible explanation for the negative effect on domestically owned enterprises
might be that foreign entry affects market structure Aitken and Harrison (2000, p. 607) note:
"If imperfectly competitive [domestic] firms face fixed costs of production, a
foreign  firm with  lower  marginal  costs  will  have  an  incentive  to  increase
production relative to  its  domestic competitor.  In this  environment, entering
foreign firms producing for the local market can draw demand from domestic
firms, causing them to cut production. The productivity of domestic firms would
fall as they spread their fixed costs over a smaller market, forcing them back up
their average cost curves.  If the productivity decline from this demand effect is
large enough, net domestic productivity can decline even if  the multinational
transfers technology."
This study looks at whether domestically owned enterprises in the transition economies
that competed with foreign enterprises were more likely to have adopted a new technology (i.e.,
access to the Internet) not at the effect of foreign entry on domestic productivity.  This allows us
to identify whether foreign investment encourages the adoption of new technologies, without
being concerned about negative effects on market structure.
Even if enterprises competing with foreign-owned firms were more likely to adopt the
new technology (i.e., access to the Internet) than enterprises competing with domestically owned
firms, this would not rule out the possibility that foreign entry has a negative impact on the
productivity of domestic enterprises.  First, even if domestically owned enterprises competing
with foreign enterprises were more adopt the new technology than other domestic enterprises,
this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  they  are  able  to  use  it  to  improve  productivity."'
lo Other  enterprise  level studies  have found  evidence  of positive  productivity  spillovers, For example,  BlomstrOm
and  Sj6holm  (1999)  find  positive  spillovers  on labor  productivity  of domestic  firms  from both  majority  and  minority
foreign  investment  in Indonesia  in 1991.
1  l For example,  domestic  enterprises  might  be able to use  new technologies  productively  only  if they  have sufficient
levels of human capital. Consistent  with this, Borensztein  et al (1998) find that FDI is more productive  that
domestic  investment  only  when  countries  have  a minimum  threshold  of human  capital.
7Consequently, it might have little impact on overall productivity.  Second, even if the adoption
did raise productivity, it would still be  possible that negative pecuniary  externalities might
outweigh any positive spillovers from the adoption of the new technology.
III.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
I1I.1  Data
Most of the data used in this paper comes from the World Business Environment Survey,
a major survey of over  10,000 enterprises in 80 countries conducted by the World Bank and
several other  agencies.  The  survey of the  transition  economies, which  was  conducted in
collaboration with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, included over 3000
enterprises from  21  transition economies. 12 The survey asked  similar questions  in  the  80
countries, although there were some differences between regions.  The most notable difference
for the purpose of this study was that questions about Internet access were only asked in the
transition economies and a couple of other countries.
12 The countries in the  sample  were:  (Commonwealth of  Independent States)  Armenia,  Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; (Early Applicants to the EU)
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia; (Other Central Europe and the Baltics) Lithuania and the
Slovak Republic; (Southeastern Europe) Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.  See Hellman et al. (2000) for a
more complete description of the WBES in the transition economies.
8In Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, about 33 percent of enterprise in
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40%-'  #  |  =  1access  to the Internet (see Table 1).
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percent).  In general, enterprises in the
Figure  2: Percent  of enterprises  with access  to the Internet  in  CIS were  less  likely  to  report  having
1999,  by region.
Data  Source: World Business  Environment Survey (WBES) 02000  The  access to the Internet than in any other
World  Bank  Group.  Note: See  footnote  12  for definition  of regions.
region  (see  Figure  2).  Not
surprisingly, enterprises in the early applicants to the EU (i.e., the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) were most likely to report having Internet access. To control for
country difference that might affect Internet access, either a set of country dummies or a set of
country control variables  are included in  the analysis.  The country level  control variables
include  main  telephone  lines  per  100  inhabitants,  to  control  for  development  of  the
telecommunications sector, per capita income, urban population, and size of the country  (see
Table 1).
The main variables of interest are related to the enterprise's  interactions with foreign
enterprises.  These include whether the enterprise has any foreign ownership (see Table 1), the
overall level of FDI and imports into the country (see Table 1), and whether its main competitors
were either foreign-owned enterprises producing in the home market or imports (see Table 2).
Since most foreign investment in these countries is from the industrialized economies t3, where
Internet access is more common than in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (see Figure 1), it seems
13 The most  important  countries  were  Germany,  the United  States,  the United  Kingdom,  France  and  Austria. Only  9
of the 268 foreign  enterprises  were from  Russia.
9plausible that foreign-owned enterprises will be more likely to have access to the Internet than
domestically owned enterprises.
The information on the enterprises' competitors comes from a question that enterprises
were asked about main source of competition they faced in domestic markets.  If there were
substantial demonstration or labor turnover effects, enterprises facing competition from foreign-
owned enterprises should be more likely to adopt similar technologies to foreign competitors
than other enterprises. Further, if demonstration effects require direct observation or only occur
when domestically owned companies hire former employees of their foreign competitors, then
the effect of competition from foreign-owned local enterprises should be greater than the effect
of competition from imports.  Finally, if  spillovers from  foreign ownership are large, then
foreign direct investment in other sectors of the economy might affect enterprises that are not
direct competitors.  Consequently, measures of total FDI and imports are also included in the
analysis with country-level controls.'4
In  addition  to  providing information on  Internet Access,  the  survey  also  provided
additional information on the enterprise's performance (see Table  1), the enterprise's  largest
shareholder, how many competitors the enterprise faced in domestic markets, how many full-
time employees the enterprise had and the enterprise's  sector of operations (see Table 2). 5
These are included in  the analysis to control for enterprise-specific factors that might affect
whether the  company has  Internet  access.  Since  Internet  access  might  affect  enterprise
performance rather than performance affecting Internet access, the analysis is conducted both
with and without these variables.
111.2 Econometric Model
The probability that enterprise i in country j has access to the Internet is assumed to be a
function of a  vector of enterprise characteristics (Xij) and country characteristics (Zj).  The
enterprise characteristics include ownership, sector of operations, size, how the enterprise was
14 These  measures  are  omitted  when  country  dummies  are  included  since  they  are  collinear  with  them.
i SThe  WBES  provided  categorical  information  on  number  of employees,  not  the  actual  number.
10established,  competition  faced  by  the  enterprise,  and,  in  some  specifications,  enterprise
performance.  The country characteristics include per capita income, openness to trade and
investment, telephone coverage, population and urban population. The probability of enterprise i
having access to the Internet is:
Prob(Internet  Access  j) = <>(a  + p  Xii + y Zj)
Where (D(o) is the standard normal distribution and (c,p,y)  is the vector of coefficients.  The
model is estimated using standard maximum likelihood estimation.  All estimated models in
Table 3 include dummies indicating sector of operations and size of the enterprise (See Table 2
for categories). Results from the model are shown in Table 3.
I11.3  Econometric Results
Foreign shareholdings and largest shareholder.  The coefficient on a dummy variable
indicating  that  the  enterprise  has  some  foreign  shareholders  is  positive  and  statistically
significant (see Table 3, column 1). This suggests that enterprises in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia that are at least partially foreign-owned are more likely to have access to the Internet than
other enterprises.  The results are similar whether country-level control variables or country
dummies are used to control for country differences (see Table 3, columns 1 and 2).  After
controlling for  whether  an  enterprise has  any  foreign ownership,  enterprises with  foreign
companies as their largest shareholder do not appear any more likely to have access to  the
Internet than enterprises where the foreign owner is only a minority shareholder.' 6 However, if
the dummy variable indicating any foreign ownership is dropped, the dummy indicating that the
largest shareholder is foreign becomes statistically significant and large (see Table 3, columns 3
and 4).
Foreign ownership has a large effect on the probability that the enterprise has Internet
access.  Whereas an state-owned enterprise without any foreign shareholders has a 24.4 percent
16 Other  papers  have looked  at the effect  of minority  and majority  foreign  ownership  on productivity.  Blomstrom
and Sjbholm  found  that although  labor  productivity  was higher  in Indonesian  enterprises  with foreign  participation,
that  the degree  of foreign  ownership  did not appear  to have  any additional  effect  on productivity.
11chance of having a  foreign owner (see Table 4), a foreign owned enterprise with a  foreign
company as its  largest shareholders is twice as  likely to  have access to  the Internet (48.8
percent).  A state-owned company with  some foreign ownership (i.e., a company where the
government is the largest shareholder but where a foreign company has a minority stake) has a
46.8 percent chance of having access to the Internet (see Table 4).
Insider-owned enterprises appear to be less likely to have access to the Internet than other
enterprises, even when compared to  state-owned enterprises.  The coefficient on the dummy
variable indicating employee ownership is negative and statistically significant whether country
controls or country dummies are included in the analysis. The coefficient on the dummy variable
indicating that the enterprises'  managers are the largest shareholders is also  negative, but  is
statistically insignificant when country controls are included in the analysis.  Based upon the
coefficients in column 1 of Table 3, manager-owned enterprises have a 17.1 percent chance of
having Internet access, employee-owned enterprises have a 17.5 percent chance, while similar
state-owned enterprises have a 24.4 percent chance (see Table 4).
Competition  from foreign-owned enterprises.  Enterprises who saw either foreign-owned
enterprises producing domestically or imports as their main competition were more likely to
have Internet access than enterprises that saw domestically owned enterprises as their main
competition.  In both cases, the effect is quite large.  A (state-owned) enterprise whose main
competition is foreign-owned enterprises producing domestically has a 34.5 percent chance of
having Internet access, an  enterprise whose main competition is imports has a 34.9 percent
chance, whereas an enterprise whose main competition is domestically-owned enterprises has
only a 24.4 percent chance (see Table 4).
The result for competition with  foreign-owned enterprises producing domestically is
consistent with the hypothesis that demonstration or labor turnover effects affect enterprises'
decisions to  adopt new  technologies (access to  the  Internet  in  this  case).  However, the
coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that imports are the enterprise's main competition
is similar in size to the coefficient indicating that foreign-owned domestic enterprises are the
12main competition.' 7 If demonstration effects were important either because of direct observation
of foreign-owned  enterprises' operations or because domestically owned enterprises hire workers
from foreign-owned plants, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating competition with
foreign-owned enterprises  producing in  the  country should  be  larger  than  the  coefficient
indicating competition  with  imports.  Taken together,  these  results  suggest  that  although
openness to trade and investment increase the likelihood that domestically owned competitors
have Internet access, foreign investment  is no more effective than trade in this respect.
One final question is whether the
70%  high probability that foreign enterprises
6  f fhave  access to the Internet is simply due
40%- _  to foreign enterprises self-selecting into
40%
sectors  where  enterprises  are  more
20%  likely to have access to the Internet (i.e.,
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°  E  12 E  E  E,>  e0  E  X  E  oE  dummies  and  dummies  indicating
8  L  a.  8  2f 
whether  the  enterprise  is  competing
Figure  3:  Probability that  foreign and domestic enterprises  with foreign or  domestic enterprises.
with  foreign  and domestic  competition  have  Internet  access.
Note: Probabilities are calculated setting  all  continuous variables to  their  To further test whether this is the case,
respective  means  and  using coefficients  from Table  6, column  (1). The  base
enterprise is a state-owned enterprise, whose main competition comes from  interaction  terms  between  foreign
other  domestically  owned  enterprises,  with  more  than  three  competitors  for its
main product line, with between 50 and 100  workers (median size), in  the  ownership and competition are included
manufacturing  sector  (most  common  sector).
in  the  base  analysis  (see  Table  6,
columns 1 and 2).  The interaction terms are statistically insignificant indicating that foreign
enterprises are more likely to have Internet access than similar domestic enterprises whether they
are in sectors where their main competition is other foreign enterprises or whether they are in
sectors where there  main competition is domestic enterprises (see  Figure  3).  This  further
17 We  are unable  to reject  the null hypothesis  that  the coefficients  are equal  at conventional  significance  levels  when
either  country  controls  or country  dummies  are included  in  the analysis.
13suggests that the higher probability of Internet access for foreign firms is not merely that they
self-select into sectors where Internet access is more common.
Enterprise origins and competition.  Enterprises that were  established as either joint
ventures or as private enterprises (i.e., de novo private enterprises) were more likely to access to
the Internet than similar enterprises that either remained state-owned or had been privatized. The
difference is quite  large, with  de  novo enterprises having a  38.0 percent  chance of having
Internet access, joint  ventures having a 66.0 percent chance, while state-owned or privatized
enterprises having only  24.4  percent  and  27.1 percent  probabilities  respectively.  Finally,
enterprises with no effective competition were generally more likely to have Internet access than
enterprises with either one to three competitors or enterprises with more than three competitors
(see Table 3).  However, this result is not highly robust.  When variables indicating enterprise
performance are included in the analysis (see Columns 5 and 6), the coefficient drops in both
size and significance level.  One plausible reason for this finding might be that enterprises facing
little effective competition perform better,  giving them the  funds needed  to  invest  in  new
technologies, such as Internet access.
Country-level  measures  of  openness.  In  addition  to  the  enterprise  level  variable
discussed above, the analysis also includes some country-level variables.  Since these variables
become collinear with the dummies once the country dummies are added, they are dropped when
country dummies are included (see Table 3, columns 2,4 and 6).  The coefficient on foreign
direct investment is statistically insignificant suggesting that FDI does not have a large effect on
the probability that enterprises other than the enterprise the foreign company invests in (and the
enterprise's  competitors) have  Internet  access.  In  contrast,  the  coefficient  on  imports  is
statistically significant and negative.  The point estimate of the coefficient suggests that the a-  I
percent increase in imports decreases the probability that domestically owned enterprises have
access to the Internet by 0.55 percent (see Table 5)
One concern is that the result for FDI might be  affected by the inclusion of the oil
producing economies of Central Asia.  In particular, FDI in two of these economies, Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan, has been far higher than in any other country in the CIS since the start of
14transition. 8  However, this investment has almost exclusively flowed to the oil sector and it is
possible that spillovers to the rest of the economy from FDI in this sector are smaller than the
spillovers from other FDI. 19 The results omitting the oil producing economies of Central Asia
are consistent with this hypothesis.  Once these economies are omitted, the coefficient on FDI
increases in magnitude and becomes statistically significant at a 1 percent level (see Table 6,
columns 3 and 4).20 The point estimate of the elasticity on FDI increases to 0.21 when these
economies are omitted.
Country Controls.  The other country controls are also significant at at least a 5 percent
level throughout the analysis.  In general, enterprises in countries with higher per capita income,
with larger urban populations and smaller countries appear more likely to have access to the
Internet.  In addition, enterprises in countries with more developed telecommunications systems
appear to be more likely to have access to the Internet.  A 1 percent increase in the number of
mainlines per  100 inhabitants increases the probability that an  enterprise has access to  the
Internet by 0.5 percent.  This result is consistent with results from a country-level analysis in
Dasgupta et al (2000), which suggest that that cross-country differences in Internet use reflect the
number of fixed mainlines per capita in a country. Including country dummies does not appear
to either affect the enterprise level results or to increase the explanatory power of the analysis -
the pseudo R-squared is similar whether country dummies or country controls are included (see
Table 3 and Table 6).
Enterprise Performance.  As a final set of control variables, some additional indicators
of enterprise performance are also included in the analysis, including employment and sales
18 Between 1993 and 1998,  there was $509 of FDI per capita in Azerbaijan and $431 per capita in Kazakhstan. In
comparison, there was less than $130 per capita over the same period in the CIS and less than $100 per capita in
most of the other economies.  The other oil exporting countries in Central Asia have received far less FDI, $179 per
capita in Turkmenistan  and $31 per capita in Uzbekistan. Russia has also received far less FDI - $84 per capita over
the same period.  Data is from European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development (2000).
19  For example, in 1998, there was $129 of FDI per capita in Azerbaijan.  However, there was only $24 per capita
outside of the oil sector.  Excluding investment in the oil sector, FDI in Azerbaijan was similar to the level in other
CIS economies for that year. Data is from International Monetary  Fund (2000).
15growth - in general, better performing enterprises should contract less than worse performing
enterprises - and percent of sales to the government.  Since there is a large literature showing
that  foreign-owned enterprises  in  the  transition  economies  generally  perform  better  than
domestically owned enterprises along a variety of dimensions, foreign-owned enterprises might
be more likely to have access to the Internet, simply because their stronger performance gives
them better access to  investment resources.21  Similarly, employee-owned enterprises, which
appear to perform worse than other enterprises, might have fewer resources for investment. 22
In general, better performing enterprises appear to be more likely to have access to the
Internet than worse performing enterprises (see Table  3), perhaps  because they have more
resources available for investment in new technologies. However, this has virtually no effect on
other results.  Most notably, the coefficients on foreign- and  insider-ownership are virtually
unchanged and remain highly significant even after these performance measures are added to the
analysis.  This suggests that better (worse) performance is not the only reason for the higher
(lower) levels of access to the Internet for foreign- (employee-) owned enterprises.
Although performance rnight affect Internet access, Internet access might also affect
enterprise performance, introducing the possibility of reverse causation when the perfornance
variables are included.  Therefore, the  analysis is conducted  both  with  and  without these
variables (see columns 1 and 2 and columns 5 and 6 in Table 3 respectively).  In practice, the
main results are virtually identical whether these performance indicators are included in  the
analysis or not.
20
Most of the other  results  of interest  do not appear  to be affected  by this change. The only changes  are that the
coefficient  on the dummy  indicating  that the enterprise  has no competitors  in its main  market  becomes  statistically
insignificant  and the coefficient  on urban  population  becomes  insignificant  when the country  controls  (rather than
country  dummies)  are included  in the analysis.
21 See footnote  7. Better performing  enterprises  might  both have  better access  to capital markets  and have higher
retained  earnings. Given  the underdeveloped  nature  of the banking  systems  and capital markets  in these  countries,
retained  earnings  are a vital  source  of resources  for investment  in  the transition  economies.
22 The  meta-analysis  in  Djankov  and  Murrell  (2000)  indicates  that ownership  by foreign  enterprises  and individuals,
ownership  by investment  funds,  ownership  by managers,  and  concentrated  individual  ownership  was  more effective
than employee-ownership  at improving  enterprise  performance.
16IV.  CONCLUSIONS
The results  from  this  study support the  assertion that  foreign investment increases
Internet access for enterprises in the transition economies.  The strongest result is that Internet
access is more common among enterprises that  are partly  foreign-owned than it  is among
enterprises that are fully domestically owned.  The effect of foreign ownership appears large -
enterprises that are partly foreign-owned  are almost twice as likely to have access to the Internet
as  state-owned and  privately owned  enterprises with  no  foreign  ownership.  Further, the
correlation between foreign ownership and Internet access does not seem to be simply because
foreign-owned enterprises tend to  out-perform other enterprises in  the transition economies,
giving them easier access to financing.  The correlation remains statistically significant even
after including variables to control for enterprise performance and  indicators of the level of
competition that the enterprise faces in domestic markets.
The  results  also  suggest that  foreign  investment has  positive  spillovers for  other
domestically owned enterprises with respect to Internet access.  In particular, the results suggest
that enterprises that compete with either foreign-owned domestic enterprises or imports are more
likely to  have Internet access.  Since competition with imports and foreign-owned domestic
enterprises both  appear to  increase the  likelihood, this  suggests that  proximity is  not  very
important. Although past studies (e.g., Aitken and Harrison, 1999) have found that competition
from foreign-owned firms reduces the productivity of their domestic competitors, the negative
effect of foreign entry on the productivity of domestic competitors is thought to be due to foreign
entry affecting market structure.  Since this study does not address the question of the size, or
even existence, of benefits related to Internet access, it is unclear whether positive technological
spillovers found in this study would outweigh pecuniary externalities.
Finally, Internet access appears more common in countries with higher levels of FDI
even  after  controlling  for  other  factors  (e.g.,  urbanization,  per  capita  income  and
telecommunications  infrastructure) that might also affect Internet access.  It is important to note
that this result holds only after the oil-exporting economies of Central Asia are excluded from
the analysis.  This strongly suggests that FDI does not  always increase the likelihood that a
17domestic enterprise will have Internet access - spillovers from investment in a single (extractive)
sector might not have the same beneficial spillover effect as other types of investment.
Other factors also affect Internet access.  Employee-owned enterprises are less likely to
have access to the Internet than other enterprises, including state-owned enterprises.  This holds
when country dummies and performance measures are included in the analysis, suggesting that it
is not due to  employee ownership being more common in countries where Internet access is
restricted or  to  employee  owned enterprises finding it  harder  to  finance  new  investment.
Finally, enterprises in countries with better telephone systems are more likely to have Internet
access even after controlling for income and urbanization.  This result is consistent with results
from a  country-level study by  Dasgupta et  al  (2000), which  suggests that  the  number of
mainlines per capita explains most of the gap between developed and developing countries with
regards to Internet connectivity. This stresses that steps that would improve the performance of
providers of fixed-line telephone services (e.g., privatizing state-owned fixed line monopolies)
would increase Internet access.
The presence of positive spillovers from foreign investment suggests that it might be
appropriate for governments to take steps to encourage foreign direct investment.  However,
although there is some evidence that investment in information technology has improved the
productivity of enterprises in the U.S, there is very little evidence on the how great the effect of
Internet access or investment in information technology is on firm performance in developing or
transition economies.23 Although the lack of evidence regarding the effect of Internet access on
firm performance in the transition economies argues against taking dramatic steps to encourage
foreign  investment, it  does  give  added  weight to  arguments  for  improving  the  business
environment. For example, there is strong evidence that corruption, which is a serious problem
23 One study that looks  at the effect  on the Internet  on firm performance  in transition  economies,  Clarke  (2001),
finds  that export  growth  is faster  for industrial  enterprises  in transition  economies  with  Internet  export  than for non-
connected  firms  even  after  controlling  for  self-selection  bias.
18in many transition economies, discourages foreign investment and slows economic growth. 24
Since reducing corruption and taking other steps to improve the business environment would
both encourage foreign investment and improve the functioning of the domestic economy, they
would benefit the domestic economy even if Internet access had  little short-term impact on
productivity or growth.
24 Mauro (1995) shows that  corruption has  a large and statistically significant effect on economic growth.  In
addition, several recent papers have found that corruption is negatively correlated with foreign direct investment.
Wei (1999), who uses FDI data from 45 developing and developed countries from  12 OECD countries, finds that
corruption in the host country has a statistically significant effect on foreign direct investment.  The effect is quite
large - a one-point increase in corruption (on a five-point scale) would decrease foreign direct investment by about
16 percent. Similarly, Gastanga et al. (1998) also find that corruption reduces foreign direct investment in a sample
of 45 less-developed  countries.
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22VI.  TABLES
Table  1: Means  and standard  deviations  of variables. _____________________________________________  Standard
Variable  Source  Mean  Deviation
Enterprise  Characteristics
Does enterprise have access to the Internet? (1-yes,0-no)  WBES  0.33  0.47
Does any foreign comany  p  Ehavainancial  stake in your organization  WBES  0.08  0.27
Percentage change in employment between 1996 and 1999.  WBES  6.52  60.39
Percentage change in sales between 1996 and 1999.  WBES  13.43  67.33
Percent of sales accounted for by state sector.  WBES  16.93  25.50
Country Control Varables
Net incoming foreign direct investment in 1998  (share of GDP)  WDI  4.54  5.11
Imports of goods and services in 1998 (share of GDP)  WDI  46.68  17.91
Main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants in 1999  ITU  22.09  10.61
Urban Population  (share of total) in 1998  WDI  61.69  12.33
Per capita GDP in 1998 (PPP, international dollars, OOOs).  WDI  5.91  3.18
Population in 1998 (natural log)  WDI  16.41  1.38
Note:  For source  variables,  WBES  implies  that data comes  from the World  Business  Environment  Survey  (WBES)  02000 The World  Bank
Group. WDI  implies  that data  comes  from  World  Bank,  2001. World  Development  Indicators.  World  Bank,  Washington  DC. ITU  implies  that
data  comes  from  Intemational  Telecommunication  Union,  2000.  World  Telecommunication  Indicators Database.  Intemational
Telecommunication  Union, Geneva, Switzerland.
23Table  2: Distribution  of enterprises  in sample.
What is biggest competitive threat to enterprises? (omitted category is domestic enterprises)
Who is the largest shareholder in enterprise? (omitted category is government)
How was enterprise established?  (omitted category is state-owned, including subsidiaries and privatized state-owned)
How many competitors  does enterprise's major product line  face in domestic markets? (omitted category is more than three)
How many full-time employees and casual st  aff in total work for this company? (omitted category is over 500)  _____
Less than nine  26.5%
Between  0 and 4?  20.0%
Between  50  n  9  16.0%
Between  100  and 199?  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~13.7%
Between200and499  15.4%
What is enterprise's main area of activity? (Omitted category is 'other')
Farming,  fishing or forestry  13.5%
Mining or quarrying  0.8%
Manufacturing  29.7%
Bulig  or construction  8.8%
Power generation  0.4%
Wholesale trade  12.5%
Retail trade  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~14.4%
Tasportation  6.1%
Financial services  1.  6%1
Pesnlservices  5.3%
Buiness  services  4.9%
Data  Source:  World  Business  Environment  Survey  (WBES)  02000 The World  Bank  Group
24Table 3: Effect of ownership on probability of enterprise having Intemnet  access.
Esfimation Method  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit
Enterprise  Enterprise  Enterprise  Enterprise  Enterprise  Enterprise
Dependent Variable  has access  has access  has access  has access  has access  has access
to Intemnet  to Internet  to Internet  to Internet  to Internet  to Intemnet
Number of Observations  2999  2999  3006  3006  2798  2798
Sector  Dummies  Ye  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Size of EnterKprise  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Dumm'ies  NoYsN  e  oYes
Foreign shareholding
Any  foregn  sharholding0.6125***  0.6361***  0.5810***  0.6265*0*
Any  foreign  shareholding  ~(4.67)  (4.69)  (4.  10)  (4.28)
Largest Shareholder  - Foreign  .58  0.44  0.470  0.649F6*  000  008
____________  (Q9 8)  (3.669  (3.~~~_Q58)  -. 4  -. 8
Largest Shareholder -Managers  -0.2581  -0.3436*  -0.2041  -0.2853  -0.2139  -0.3097*
.-.  ..~~~~.......A:.!2....  £1.95)  (-1.19)  (-1.63)  (:1.17)~~~~~~~~~~!.  .-  ... .. (1.66_
Largest  Shareholder  -Employees  -0.2398**  -0.3049**  -0.2304**  -0.2950**  -0.2811**  -0.3228***
Largst harholer  - OherPriate  0.0823  -0.0051  0.1174  0.0322  0.0504  -0.0305
Largest hareholdr--  Othe  Private(0.86)  (-0.05)  (1.23)  (0.33)  I  (0.50)  (-0.29)
Main  Competition -imports  0.3054***  0.3118***  0.32000**  0.3265***  0.3309***  0.3378*0*
Copttinifoen-ond  0.2944***  0.2608**  0.3036*0*  0.2693***  0.2370**  0.2059*
domestic  enterprises  (2.92)  (2.52)  (3.05)  (2.64)  (2.28)  (1.93)
Fir  Esabishd  s Pivte  ntrprse  0.3043***  0.3220***  0.3127***  0.3259***  0.21560**0  ,O2445***0
Fir  EsabisedasPrvae.nt..is  --- 2-)--.-J-.......(4.06)  O1).  (2~62  2. 88Ž-_
Firm Established as Joint Venture  0.49440*  0.5024**  0.6982*0*  0.7150*0*  0.4666*  0.5184**
. ~.-  .........  .j20  (3.0.....2.97)  (1D.85)  ....... Q7-
Between one and  three competitors.  -0.0141  -0.0554  0.0059  -0.0309  0.0285  -0.03  17
. .....  . A4~(-.  l)  (-0.53)  (06  03)  (.7  02)
No  competitors  ~~0.1709*0  0.  1441*  0.18140*  0.15360*  0.151600  0.1290
No  competitors  ~~~~~~(2.10)  (1.73)  (2.24)  (1.86)  (1.77)  (1.48)
Foreign Direct Investment  006  .010.0062
Imports (0/o  of GDP)0.01  19***  -0.01  190**  -0.01210**
Imports (%  of  GOP)  ~~~~(-4.42)  (4.48)  (-433)
lonyct-rntrls.….  .. ,  ..
Number of telephone lines per 100  0.0228*0*  0.0226***  0.02080**
..  ~~~~~~~~~~~J{992  .~~~~~~~~.  ...  ....  . -....... (3.46-.-
Urban Population  0.01000*  0.0096**  0.01130*0
. . ~~~~~~~~~~~~±  !  L  . ....  . - ￿  2.3  7  9  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  ... ... ............  ...
Per Capita GDP  0.0826*0*  0.08140**  0.0815***
Populatin  (Naturl  Log)  0.1713***  -0.1793***  -0.19000***
Population (Natural  Log)  ~~(4.33)  (4.59)  (.4.56)  _____
Enterprise-level  performnca,e  _____
Employment Growth  0.0023*0*  0.0022***
(over last three years)  (3.96)  (3.78)
Sales Growth  --O.0017***  0.0017*0*
(over  last three years)  (3.61)  (3.70)
Sales to Government  0.0009*0*  0.0017
(% of sales)  (0.71)  (1.33)
Pseudo R-Squared  0.25  0.28  0.25  0.27  1  0.27  0.29
Note: t-statistics in parentheses  ***Significant ati1percent level  **  Significant at 5percent level  *Significant  at 10 percent Level
Data Source: The World Business Environment Survey  (WBES) 02000 The World Bank Group.
Omitted categories are state-owned enterprises (as largest shareholders) and enterprises  established as state-owned enterprises (origin)




Base Enterprise  24.4%
Fo eignsharholdn_  ____  ____
Any  foreign  shareholding  46.8% Owne.rship  _  _  -,,...............  -- ___  - _  ---  . .......
Largest  Shareholder  - Foreig'  48.8%
Largest  Shareholder  - Manei_s  17.1%
_arges_t hareholder  - Employees  17.5%
Largest  Shareholder  -- Other  Private  27.1%
Competition  fromJoreig!ers  __
Main  Co  m  ion  - imports  34.9%
Main  Competition  - foreign-owned  domestic  enterprises  34.5%
._Entep  e-levelcontols  ____
Firm  Established  as Private  Enterpris_  38.0%
Firm  Established  as Joint  Venture  between  foreign  and domestic  enterrises '  66.0%
Between  one  and three  cometitors  _  __.-  24.0%
No competitors  30.1%
Note:  Probabilities  are  calculated  setting  all continuous  variables  to their respective  means  and  using  coefficients  from Table  3, column  (1). The
base  enterprise  is a state-owned  enterprise,  whose  main  competition  comes  from other domestically  owned  enterprises,  with more than three
competitors  for its main  product  line,  with between  50 and 100  workers  (median  size),  in the manufacturing  sector  (most  common  sector). All
other enterprises  are the same as the base  type with changes  as noted in the title column.  If the largest  shareholder  is foreign,  the dummy
indicating  any foreign  shareholder  is also set to "1". b If the firm is established  as private,  the dummy  indicating  that the largest  shareholder  is
(other)  private  (i.e.,  not state-owned)  is also set to "I".  'If  the firm  is ajoint venture  between  foreign  and  domestic,  the dummy  indicating  some
foreign  shareholding  is set to "1".
Table  5: Elasticities  of the probability  of having  Internet  access  with  respect  to continuous  variables.
Variable  Elasticity
Country-level  measures of openness
Net incomin  fore  investment in1998  shareof  DP)__  _____  0.03
Imports of goods and services in 1998 (share of GDP)  -0.55***
n  Control  Variables  ...  .....  -
Main telehone  linespe100  inhabitants in 1999  0.50***
Urban Population share of total) in 1998  0.62**
Per capita GDP in 1998 (PPP, international dollars, 000s)  0.49***
Population in 1998 (natural log)  -0.17***
Enteprise-levelperfrman  ce  __
Percentage change in employmentbetween 1996 and 1999.  _  _.***
Perentgechang  in sales between 1996 and 1999.  0.03  _
Percent of sales accounted for by state sector.  0.03*
***  Significant  at 1 percent  level  **  Significant  at 5 percent  level  * Significant  at 10  percent  Level
Note:  Probabilities  are calculated  setting  all continuous  variables  to their respective  means  and  using  coefficients  from  Table  3, colunm  (l).  The
base enterprise  is a state-owned  enterprise,  whose  main  competition  comes  from other domestically  owned  enterprises,  with more than three
competitors  for its main  product  line,  with  between  50 and 100  workers  (median  size),  in the  manufacturing  sector  (most  common  sector).
26Table 6: Effect of ownership on probability of enterprise having Internet access.
Estimation  Method  Probit  Probit  , Probit  Probit
Enterprise  Enterprise  Enterprise  Enterprise
Dependent  Variable  has  access  has  access  has access  has  access
to Intemet  to Intemet  to Intemet  to Intemet
Oil  Oil
Sample  All  All  Exporters  Exporters
Omitted  Omitted
Number  of Observations  2999  2999  2638  2638
Sector Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Size  of Enterrise Dmmies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country  Dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes
Foreign  shareholding
. _  ___  ___  ...  __..  ..  _0.6280***  0.6579***  0.70i5***  0.7256***
Any foreign shareholding  (4.26)  (4.31)  (4.95)  (4.95)
Interacdon  Term
Foreign companies facing competition  0.0937  0.0932
from foreign-owned  companies  (0.32)  (0.31)
Foreign companies facing competition  -0.1543  -0.1799
from imports  (-0.56)  (-0.64)
Ownez~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  ...... ....  ........ _  ......  ..  __  .- - -... ..~..  . .-.  ..- ._._.  . ...
Largest Shareholder -Foreign  0.0416  0.0268  -0.1514  -0.1592
Largest~~~  ~  ~~~ Shrhld0-Freg.°199  (9.12)  _(  .65)  -. 6
Largest Shareholder  - Managers  -0.2620  -0.3487**  -0.2946*  -0.3684** .. i±  .. 0-4  .. )..L_(2)....20__
Largest Shareholder  - Employees  -0.2407**  -0.3061**  -0.2571**  -0.3304**
Lre-E...052.  (-2.  06)...552_  _
Largest Shareholder  --  Other Private  0.0811  -0.0065  0.0644  -0.0252 g  0.84~~~~~~~~~L~  (-0.07)  (0.62)  (-0.23)
ComfrmiifroeiRnm  .p...ers
MainCompetition- imports  0.3220**-  .. 3522  53210  _  (  0952***
......  (352)  C3.52)  (3.429 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.....  3!
Main Competition  - foreign-owned  0.2785***  0.2441**  0.2426**  0.2193**
domestic  enterprises  (2.57)  (2.20)  (2.32)  (2.t4)
Ent!e!prise-evei  controls
Firm Established as Private Enterprise  0.30369***  0.3  03032.  .3723083) .... 229X  (400)  L3.72)~~~~~~~~~~.  ￿Si.83)  ..
Firm Established as Joint Venture  0.4961**  0.5035**  0.4593*  0.5013*
-lrm  EstabXshed  m Joint.Venmm  (2 06)  11.99  1.72)  ..  1 7
8).
Between one and three competitors  -0.0150  -0.0565  0.0442  -0.0156
B  etw  een  on  e  a  nd  thr  ee  competitors  ..  _  (-°.-  1.51  .....  -.  (-°  542  _  L.  5.°  .4.  12  ....  ..  ....  5-°:_.4..  ...  .....  .....
0.1715**  0.1447*  0.1184  0.0937
No competitors  (2.10)  (1.73)  (1.38)  (1.06)
Counry e  measure_foennes  s  of
Foreign Direct Investment  0.0061  0.0463***
Imports (% of GDP)  -0.0118*3*  (-4.57)2  .
Country  c!ntrols  .... . _  . _....  _.  .......
Number of telephone lines per 100  0.0227***  0.0193***
inhabitants  _  _  _  372  . .29
Urban Population  0.0099***  0.0063
l  f_  __-  138_  ._
Per Capita GDP  0.0830***  0.0990***
5000s  of US$)  .A5  412  -.. 11-
-0.1705***  -0.1189***
Population (Natural Log)  (-4.30)  (-2.76)
Pseudo R-Squared  0.25  0.28  0.25  0.27
Note: t-statistics in parentheses  **" Significant at I percent level  **  Significant at 5 percent level  * Significant at 10 percent Level
Data Source: The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 02000  The World Bank Group.
Omitted categories are state-owned enterprises (as largest shareholders)  and enterprises established as state-owned enterprises (origin)
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